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COMMENT
Due Process in the Public Schools-An Analysis of the Procedural
Requirements and a Proposal for Implementing Them
On January 22, 1975, the United States Supreme Court decided
what may be the most important education case since Brown v. Board of
Education.1  In Goss v. Lopez2 the Court held that public school
students are constitutionally entitled to some form of due process protec-
tion before being totally excluded "from the educational process for
more than a trivial period."3  Although the Court's holding may, on
first reading, seem innocuous,4 one need only read Justice Powell's
dissent to sense that procedural protections may also be required with
respect to "a multitude of [previously] discretionary decisions" affecting
school children.5 Moreover, as if to emphasize the importance of its
decision in Goss, four weeks later, in Wood v. Strickland,6 the
Court held that school board members may be individually liable for
money damages if they violate a student's procedural rights, thus creat-
ing a potent weapon for the enforcement of the very ights that the
Court had only recently recognized.7
Although the Goss decision can hardly be viewed as a complete
surprise in light of the enormous expansion of procedural due process
requirements mandated by the courts since the seminal case of Goldberg
v. Kelly,8 the decision comes at a particularly critical time for public
education in the United States. Persuasive critiques of the school
system have exposed a multitude of problems that face virtually every
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
3. Id. at 576.
4. The court expressly limited its holding to suspensions of less than ten days, id.
at 584, and required only minimal procedural protections with respect to such suspen-
sions, id. at 581.
5. Id. at 597.
6. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
7. Id. at 327-29 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1274-75 (1975).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). If there is anything surprising about Goss at all, it is the
willingness of the Court to order due process protections with respect to suspensions of
only one day. 419 U.S. at 585 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting). This action prompted Judge
Friendly to ask "whether government can do anything to a citizen without affording him
'some kind of hearing."' Friendly, supra note 7, at 1275.
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school system in the country.9  At the same time, many systems are
being confronted with new problems caused by school desegregation
and its aftermath.' 0 "[I]ndiscriminate reliance upon the judiciary, and
the adversary process, as the means of resolving many of the most
routine problems arising in the classroom"'" would arrive at a time
when divisiveness in the schools is already high and school administra-
tors are searching for mechanisms that encourage unity rather than
factionalism within the school community. 2
What may be too easily forgotten is that due process is a flexible
concept, not a yardstick or mechanical instrument.' 3 Because what
constitutes due process varies according to the interests involved,14
adversary proceedings are not always required as long as the procedures
that are adopted insure fundamental fairness.' 5 Indeed, the Goss hold-
ing can be viewed, not as a statement of procedural orthodoxy but as a
means of analyzing school officials' everyday determinations with an eye
to devising safeguards against erroneous action without exacerbating
tensions already present in the system.
DUE PROCESS-THE INTERESTS PROTECTED AND THE
NATURE OF THE PROTECTION
The constraints placed upon the states by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment "[are] not infinite."'16 In order for proce-
dural protections to be constitutionally required, a deprivation of either
liberty or property must be at stake.'1 Significantly, it is the nature of
9. E.g., H. KOHL, 36 CHILDREN (1967); J. KozoL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE
(1967); C. SiLBERmAN, CIsis IN THE CLASSROOM, (1970).
10. For an explanation of the nature of the problems that face newly desegregated
school systems and some of the disturbing responses to such problems see CHILDREN'S
DEFENSE FUND REPORT, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS-ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? (1975)
[hereinafter cited as SUSPENSIONS]; SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL AND THE ROBERT F.
KENNEDY MEMORIAL, THE STUDENT PUSHOUT-VICTIM OF CONTINUED RESISTANCE TO
DESEGREGATION (1973) [hereinafter cited as STUDENT PUSHOUT].
11. 419 U.S. at 594 (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. E.g., Calkins, Are Students Involved in Deciding Crucial Issues?, 384 NAT'L
Ass'N OF SECOND. SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULL. 13 (1974); Lovetree, Student Involvement
on School Committees, 373 NAT'L ASS'N OF SECOND. SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULL. 133
(1973).
13. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
14. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
15. Friendly, supra note 7, at 1289; see Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of
the Adversary System, 75 COLum. L. Rav. 845, 860 (1975); Wright, The Constitution
on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1060 (1969).
16. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
17. Id. at 569.
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the interest at stake, and not its weight, that determines whether due
process requirements apply.'" Thus, the first step in any due process
inquiry is an examination of the "precise nature [of the] interest that
has been affected by governmental action."'19 Once it is established that
a deprivation of property or liberty is not de minimis, its gravity is
irrelevant to the determination that at least some form of due process is
required."9 It follows that, in order to ascertain whether a particular
educational decision must be accompanied by due process procedures,
the first inquiry is whether the decision infringes upon the property or
liberty interests of a student or his parents.
The Property Interest"'
"Much of the existing wealth of this country takes the form of
rights that do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of prop-
erty."' Rather, our society is built around a concept of entitlements,
many of which flow from the government and may involve subsidies to
farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines, channels for television
stations and welfare for the poor.3
The landmark case in the recognition of this "new property" is
Goldberg v. Kelly,24 in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the due process clause requires that persons receiving aid under
the federally assisted program of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) or under the state sponsored New York Homes Relief
Program should "be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termina-
tion of benefits."2 5 The Court held that welfare benefits are a statuto-
ry entitlement,26 adding that "lt may be realistic to regard welfare
entitlements as more like 'property' than a 'gratuity' ." 7  Once this
18. Id. at 570-71.
19. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440, 442 (1960).
20. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring).
21. No discussion of the property interest as it is currently viewed by the courts
would be complete without acknowledgement of the enormous influence of Charles Reich
and his trilogy of pathbreaking articles on the subject: Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches
and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE LJ. 1347 (1963); Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE ..J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YAL-E L.J 1245 (1965).
22. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
23. Id., citing Reich, 74 YALE LJ., supra note 21, at 1255.
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
25. Id. at 260.
26. Id. at 262.
27. Id. at 262 n.8.
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broadened concept of property was recognized by the Court its scope
expanded rapidly to include, for instance, a state employee's entitlement
to continued employment absent sufficient cause for discharge,28 an old
age benefits recipient's entitlement to payments as long as specified
qualifications are met,29 a former prisoner's interest in his continued
parole,30 and a prisoner's interest in good time credits accumulated
under state law.31 None of these entitlements are "'created by the
Constitution. Rather, they are created'. . . by an independent source
such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. '8 2
Once such an entitlement is created, however, a person cannot be
deprived of it without first being afforded due process of law.3
In Goss v. Lopez the Supreme Court identified just such an entitle-
ment in an Ohio law that directs local authorities "to provide a free
education to all residents between six and 21 years of age' 3 4 and in a
state law that requires student attendance for a school year of not less
than 32 weeks.3 5 The Court stated that once Ohio had chosen to
extend the right to an education to the individual, the state "may not
withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally
fair procedures .. ". . ,6 The opinion stressed that the entitlement
came not from the Constitution"7 but from state law and that the only
constitutional rights involved were the student's due process rights.88
The kind of state created educational entitlements relied upon in
Goss are virtually universal.3 9  In addition, states are increasingly pro-
viding by statute for more than just the rudimentary entitlement to a
public education. States have created by statute the right to appropriate
educational services for the physically handicapped, mentally retarded
28. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
29. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
30. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
31. Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
32. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 572-73, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972).
33. Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); id. at 164 (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 171 (White, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Omio Rnv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.48, -.64 (Page 1971).
35. Id. § 3321.04.
36. 419 U.S. at 574.
37. The Court has previously held that there is no constitutional right to an
education at public expense. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
38. 419 U.S. at 572-73.
39. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-1 (1971). Only Mississippi leaves to legislative
discretion whether or not to provide public education. Miss. CONST. art. 8, § 213-B(b)-
(c). Local school authorities also possess the authority to abolish their school district.
MIss. CODE ANN. § 37-7-101 (1972).
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and emotionally disturbed" as well as the right to bilingual education
for non-English speaking students. 41 The entitlements involved in such
statutes are generally harder to define than the ones discusssed in Goss
because analysis may involve an evaluation of the appropriateness of the
education that is provided rather than merely a determination of wheth-
er a deprivation has taken place.4 2
The Liberty Interest
The liberty interest involves, among other things, a person's reputa-
tion, or put another way, one's interest in keeping his name free from
stigma. 3 The interest was given its broadest interpretation in the case
of Wisconsin v. Constantineau,44 an action challenging a Wisconsin
statute which permitted designated officials to post the names of habitu-
al drunkards in retail liquor outlets and other public places without a
prior hearing. The Supreme Court held that "[wihere a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him [due process] is essential,"4 and thus, the
Wisconsin posting procedures must be preceded by some kind of hear-
ing.46  The Court found some support for its holding in past cases that
protected against "a badge of infamy" 47 and "grievous loss ... though
it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction"; 48
but the reputational interest it described was broader than any it had
40. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-179.1 (1975). All states but Mississippi provide
for educational services for some handicapped children, though much of the legislation is
limited in scope. For a summary of legislation in the area see BUREAu OF EDUCATION
FOR THE HANDICAPPED, DEPT. OF HEA.:TH EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CLOSER LOOK
(Spring 1974) (enclosed chart).
41. Eleven states have made bilingual education for non-English speaking students
mandatory where more than a specified number of students in the district do not speak
English. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71A (1972). Many other states make bilingual
education programs optional, leaving the decision to local school districts. E.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 102(16) (1971). See generally HARVARD CENTER FOR LAW
Arm FDUCATION, BILINGUAL-BIcULTUPAL EDUCATION: A HANDBOOK FOR ArORNEYs AND
COMMUNrIy WORKERs 274 (1975).
42. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71B, § 3 (Supp. 1974) which provides for a
hearing if parents disagree with the special education placement of their child.
43. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. 400U.S. 433 (1971).
45. Id. at 437.
46. Id.
47. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
48. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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previously defined.4 9  Like the new property interests established in
Goldberg, the Court in Constantineau created a new liberty interest.
In determining that the short-term suspension of a high school
student is an infringement upon a liberty interest, the Goss court looked
to Constantineau as a basis for holding that the reputation of students is
constitutionally protected against arbitrary action.50 In deciding that
the infringement was more than de minimis the Court detailed a num-
ber of harmful effects that may result from this infringement such as
damage to the pupil's standing among his teachers and fellow pupils
and interference with the opportunity for higher education and future
employment.51
Although not discussed by the Goss court, the language of Con-
stantineau is arguably broad enough to encompass a wide range of
school determinations that in one way or another stigmatize or label a
student: For instance, the labeling of a student as a disciplinary
problem may affect the way teachers and school administrators relate
to him in the future as well as his own self esteem. 3  The classi-
fication of a normal student as mentally retarded may have disas-
trous implications not only for the quality of education that he receives
but also for the way his family and friends perceive him as well as his
chances for further education and employment. 4 Placement of an
average student in a low, or worse still, "dead end" track", may produce
a similar result.5 6 In fact, some experts believe that giving a child a
negative label, whether it be "emotionally disturbed," "slow," "trouble-
maker," or something comparable, is one way of encouraging the im-
49. 400 U.S. at 437.
50. 419 U.S. at 574-75.
51. Id. at 575.
52. For a summary of the studies that document the harms associated with labeling
of students by school officials, see W. FINDLEY & M. BRYAN, ABILITY GROUPING: 1970,
STATUS, IMPACT, AND ALTERNATIVES (1971).
53. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitu-
tional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 577 (1971); Kirp, Schools As Sorters: The
Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705,
733 (1973).
54. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (N.D. Cal. 1972); irp, supra note
53, at 733-37. See generally R. ROSENTHAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN TiE
CLASSROOM (1968).
55. Dead-end tracking is a term that is commonly used to refer to the phenomenon
in which a student, once assigned to a low track, has little or no chance of advancing to
a higher track. For an example of "dead-end" traoking in the Washington, D.C. schools
see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 459-64 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
56. Kirp, supra note 53, at 735-36.
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plicit prediction manifested by the label to come true.5 If a student is
already experiencing difficulty in school, unfairly or arbitrarily to saddle
him with a stigmatizing label makes his chances of adjusting all the
more difficult.5
The Protection Required
Once it is established that protected interests are at stake, they must
be analyzed to determine what kind of protections are required. Such
an analysis must be undertaken with the understanding that due process
is "an elusive concept,"59 highly practical in nature"0 which therefore
does not entail "procedures universally applicable to every imaginable
situation."6 At a minimum, however, due process requires that depri-
vations of liberty and property "be preceded by notice and opportunity
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 62
In a recent article, Judge Friendly provided some guidance in
determining what constitutes an appropriate hearing: "The required
degree of procedural safeguards varies directly with the importance of
the private interest affected and the need for and usefulness of the
particular safeguard in the given circumstances and inversely with the
burden and any other adverse consequences . ... A similar ap-
proach had already been suggested as a means of determining the
elements necessary in school disciplinary hearings.64 This approach
could be applied to any decision made by public school administrators
and entails an examination of the decision to determine what, if any,
protected interests it infringes and if an infringement exists, an evalua-
tion of those procedural elements that would be most useful in insuring
fairness while minimizing adverse consequences.65
57. E.g., E. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION-ETHINKING HE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM 118-26 (1973). When this "pygmalion effect" is coupled with the fact that
researchers have found that school classifications have a marginal and sometimes
negative impact on both student achievement and psychological development, the inva-
sion of the liberty interest becomes more serious. See Kirp, supra note 53, at 725, citing
Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded: Is Much of it Justified?, in PROBLEMS
AND IssuEs IN THE EDUCAnON OF EXCEPONAL CHILDREN 382 (R. Jones ed. 1971).
58. Cf. SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 48-54.
59. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
60. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 578.
61. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
62. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
63. Friendly, supra note 7, at 1278.
64. Buss, supra note 53. See also Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A
Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 463 (1963).
65. Judge Friendly lists eleven elements of a fair hearing: unbiased tribunal, notice
of proposed action and the grounds asserted for it, opportunity to present reasons why
1976]
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It should be remembered when determining appropriate procedural
elements that school officials possess wide discretion in choosing a
particular procedural mode. Professor Wright suggests that hearings
paralleling criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings are appropriate
"as long as [they are] reasonably calculated to be fair to the student
involved and to lead to a reliable determination of the issues." 60 Other
commentators have pointed out that Goss presents an opportunity to
experiment with hearings that are less adversarial than is normally the
case.6 7  Others have proposed adopting mechanisms developed in civil
law countries such as the ombudsman for use in the public school
context.68 Such innovations might be acceptable to the courts in light
of their reluctance to impose an adversarial mode on school decision-
making. Certainly the opportunity for procedural innovation should be
explored. 69
Goss APPLIED-THE PROCEDURES THAT MUST ACCOMPANY
EDUCATIONAL DETERMINATIONS
As Professor Wright has observed, "[w]ithout procedural safe-
guards the substantive protection [provided to students by the courts]
would be virtually useless." 70  In Goss the Supreme Court established
that public school students have constitutionally protected procedural as
well as substantive rights.71 Although the Goss court dealt specifically
with short-term suspensions, its analysis of the liberty and property in-
terests involved in such suspensions is equally applicable to almost
every other determination made by school officials affecting students. 72
the proposed action should not be taken, right to call witnesses, right to know evidence
against one, right to have the decision based only on the evidence presented, right to
counsel, right to a record of the proceedings, statement of reasons for the decision, public
attendance, and judicial review. Friendly, supra note 7, at 1279-95. Judge Friendly's
discussion of the relative importance of these elements assumes the use of an adversary
system, although he states he has "serious misgivings on that score." Id. at 1279 n.71.
66. Wright, supra note 15, at 1060.
67. Verkuil, supra note 15, at 860. See Friendly, supra note 7, at 1290-91.
68. W. GELLHORN, WHEN A mucs ComPLAiN 208-11 (1966); Verkuil, supra
note 15, at 860.
69. See text accompanying notes 222-57 infra.
70. Wright, supra note 15, at 1059.
71. 419 U.S. at 574.
72. In his dissenting opinion in Goss, Justice Powell stated:
Teachers and other school authorities are required to make many decisions that
may have serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for example,
how to grade the student's work, whether a student passes or fails a course,
whether he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take certain subjects,
whether he may be excluded from interscholastic athletics or other extracur-
ricular activities, whether he may be removed from one school and sent to an-
other, whether he may be bused long distances when available schools are near-
[Vol. 54
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There are at least eleven important administrative determinations that
school officials make that call forth differing substantive and procedural
responses. Each can be analyzed to determine first, whether a protected
interest is involved and, if so, second, the nature of that interest and the
particular procedures that may be appropriate to protect it.
1. Expulsions and Suspensions
Although Goss sanctioned suspensions as both "a necessary tool to
maintain order'" 73 and "a valuable educational device,"74 it held that
protected interests are involved and thus due process procedures are
required. 75  The property interest involved emanates from the state's
compulsory education statute which has been held to entitle all who are
required to attend school to a free public education. 76  Once the state
has extended such an entitlement it cannot take it away for even a day
without due process of law. 77
The seriousness of the infringement on protected property interests
varies with the length of the suspension. Short-term suspension is not
so serious an infringement as long-term suspension, and expulsion is
the most serious infringement of all.78  The seriousness of the infringe-
by, and whether he should be placed in a "general," "vocational," or "college-
preparatory" track.
In these and many similar situations claims of impairment of one's educa-
tional entitlement identical in principle to those before the Court today can be
asserted with equal or greater justification.
Id. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 580.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 574. Many educational experts disagree with the Court's assessment of
the educational value of suspension. One commentator has stated that "[tihe real issue
is not primarily whether Mary or Bob should be removed from somewhere. The issue
is: what do we have to provide for Bobby or Mary to be included into?" Redl,
Disruptive Behavior in the Classroom, 83 U. Cm. SCHOOL Rnv. 569, 593 (1975). A
recent report by the Children's Defense Fund supports this position by detailing a wide
range of harms that grow out of suspension and expulsion. The report also suggests a
number of alternatives to such exclusionary practices. SusPNsIoNs, supra note 10, at
95-108. For a list of some of the alternatives to suspension that have been developed by
educators, see text accompanying notes 146-50 infra.
76. See notes 34-41 and accompanying text supra.
77. Although the majority in Goss "speaks of 'exclusion from the educational
process for more than a trivial period. . . ,' its opinion makes clear that even one day's
suspension invokes the constitutional procedure mandated today." 419 U.S. at 585 n.3
(Powell, J., dissenting). See Friendly, supra note 7, at 1275.
78. Compare Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) and Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools. 306 F. Supp. 1388
(E.D. Mich. 1969) (expulsions) with Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d
299 (5th Cir. 1971) (long-term suspension) and Jackson v. Hepinstall, 328 F. Supp.
1104 (N.D.N.Y. 1971) (short-term suspensions).
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ment is not always immediately apparent, however, because suspen-
sions may become permanent as other factors come into play such as
the difficulty of making up missed work and class discussion, the
greater likelihood of running afoul of the law, and the generally nega-
tive attitudes toward school that suspensions may engender. 9
A similar analysis is applicable to the protected liberty interests
involved. The longer the exclusion from school, the greater the in-
fringement. If a suspension of less than ten days will adversely affect a
student's reputation with his teachers and peers, and hurt his chances of
both furthering his education and gaining employment, 80 then suspen-
sion for a longer period of time or expulsion will create a degree of
stigma that may well close completely a wide range of educational and
employment opportunities.81
This sliding scale of harm associated with suspension and expul-
sion indicates that, the longer the suspension, the greater the need for
procedural safeguards with expulsion requiring the most formal pro-
ceedings. However, because the harms associated with long-term sus-
pensions and expulsions are nearly equivalent,82 the case law has gener-
ally treated them alike for purposes of determining adequate procedures,
choosing to draw the line between long-term suspensions and expul-
sions on the one hand and short-term suspensions on the other."' Be-
cause Goss gave Supreme Court approval to procedures involving sus-
pensions of ten days or less it is likely that draftsmen will use the ten
day period as a guide in drawing the line between long-term and short-
term suspensions.
Lower federal courts have attempted to resolve these procedural
issues in a variety of contexts. At one time or another the following
procedures have been required: written notice specifying both the viola-
tion and the evidence upon which it is based,84 the right to present
79. Brief for Appellee at 33-36, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See
SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 50-54.
80. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
81. Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961).
82. Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H. 1973).
83. Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.
1973); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603-04 (D.N.H. 1973); Mills v. Board
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). Contra, Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp.
202, 210-12 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
84. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C.
1972).
650 [Vol. 54
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witnesses, 85 the right to cross-examine,86 the right to counsel,87 the right
to an unbiased decisionmaker, s8 and the right to specific findings of
fact.8 9 With respect to suspensions of less than ten days, Goss held that,
except in exceptional cases, 90 prior to the suspension "the student
[should] be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and,
if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence. . . and an opportu-
nity to present his side of the story." 91 Al of this may occur within a
few minutes of the alleged infraction.92 After ascertaining the facts, the
disciplinarian "may determine himself to summon the accuser, permit
cross-examination, and allow the student to present his own witness-
es. ' 93 Although these summary procedures were designed to serve as a
hedge against erroneous action, they may fall short of accomplishing that
goal because the disciplinarian must choose between the word of the
teacher and that of the student. At least one commentator has sug-
gested that in this situation the student stands little chance of prevail-
ing.9
4
An additional factor that might require alteration of the formula
for determining when less formal procedures should be implemented is
racial bias. Reports indicate that a disproportionate number of black
students are suspended for disciplinary reasons; this is most likely to
occur in the aftermath of school desegregation."5 One judge has cited
"institutional racism" as the cause of this phenomenon.96 Although
85. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C.
1972); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
86. Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Givens v. Poe,
346 F. Supp. 202,209 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
87. Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Givens v. Poe,
346 F. Supp. 202,209 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
88. Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.
1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Givens v. Poe,
346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972).
89. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 882 (D.D.C. 1972); Dejesus v.
Pemberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70,76-77 (D. Conn. 1972).
90. The Court defined these exceptional cases as when a student's presence "poses
a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the
academic process . . . ." 419 U.S. at 582. In such cases the necessary hearing should
follow "as soon as practicable." Id. at 582-83.
91. Id.at581.
92. Id. at 582.
93. Id. at 584.
94. Weckstein, The Supreme Court and the Daily Life of Schools: Implications of
Goss v. Lopez, 20 INEQUAIY IN EDUCATION 47, 49 (1975).
95. STUDENT PUSHOUT, supra note 10; SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 63-75.
96. Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Tex. 1974). For a
discussion of the events leading up to this case and its aftermath see Demarest & Jordan,
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bias in the implementation of due process procedures may not be the
cause of racially disproportionate suspensions, commentators are begin-
ning to suggest that where a significantly disproportionate number of
minority students are suspended or expelled from a school system, a
presumption of racial bias exists that school officials should be required
to rebut.9" Such a presumption, whether judicially or administratively
imposed, might force implementation of the more formalized procedures
now reserved for long-term suspensions and expulsions in instances of
short-term suspensions as well.
2. Non-Disciplinary Exclusion
The exclusion of a child from school because of a physical or
mental handicap involves virtually the same infringement of protected
interests as do suspensions and expulsions. 98 With respect to the prop-
erty interest involved, even generally worded compulsory education
statutes have been held to vest an entitlement to special education in
children who by virtue of a physical or mental handicap need special
attention.9" Statutes in many states define the dimensions of the prop-
erty interest in a special education. 100 The liberty interests involved are
more obfuscated since some degree of stigmitization may already exist
with respect to handicapped students, but the denial of a special educa-
tion may result in further stigmitization that could be eliminated or at
least minimized.
Because the protected interests infringed by exclusion and expul-
sion are almost identical, the same procedural protections would seem
appropriate in both instances.' 0 ' However, because exclusion also has
Hawkins v. Coleman: Discriminatory Suspensions and the Effect of Institutional Racism
on School Discipline, 20 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 25 (1975).
97. E.g., SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 75-78.
98. The Special Education Acts in many states make the exclusion of physically or
mentally handicapped students on the grounds that they are uneducable or inadequate
facilities exist to educate them illegal. See note 40 supra. In states that have more
limited legislation, severely handicapped children are commonly denied access to any
publicly supported education. Kirp, Buss, & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Educa-
tion: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 41 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Special Education]. Yet there is strong evidence that even the most
severely handicapped children are capable of benefitting from an education. Id. at 42.
99. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
100. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-179.1(a)(1) and (2) (1973) provide for a
hearing whenever a child is denied entry or continuance in a program suitable to his
needs or is placed in a program inappropriate to his needs. Such a statute, arguably,
defines a property interest in a correct special education placement.
101. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972).
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many of the characteristics of a special education classification, " addi-
tional provisions should be included that allow both for parties other
than the parents to challenge the exclusion of a student and for the use
of expert testimony as part of the fact finding process.'0 3 An adversary
proceeding may be appropriate only to determine whether a child is to
be completely excluded; 0 4 less formal proceedings such as those recom-
mended with respect to special education placement may be appropriate
once it has been determined that the student is entitled to some kind of
an education. 05
3. Involuntary Transfers
Justice Powell declared the protected interests implicated by invol-
untary transfers as "identical in principal" to those discussed by the
majority in Goss.'0 6 However, "involuntary transfer" is a broad term
that may refer to at least three types of administrative action: discipli-
nary transfers, programmatic transfers, and public policy transfers.
Each requires separate analysis.
With respect to disciplinary transfers, at least one court has viewed
the interests infringed upon as "somewhat less drastic [than ex-
pulsion]"' ' while another has held that identical procedural safe-
guards are required for both. 0 8 In the case of Quintinella V. Carey,0 9
an action challenging the transfer of a high school student, the court
characterized a transfer to a high school equivalency class that met at
night as the "functional equivalent of an absolute expulsion" because it
infringed upon the student's right to obtain a "standard high school
diploma" and therefore required a formal due process hearifig."1 0 The
analytical difficulty with such transfers is that they may vary enormously
in the degree that they infringe upon protected interests if, in fact, they
102. See text accompanying notes 127-30 infra.
103. Special Education, supra note 98, at 126.
104. It should be noted that two recent decisions, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), have prohibited the exclusion of children with
special needs from the public schools. If these cases are followed, the need for adversary
proceedings will no longer exist.
105. See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
106. 419 U.S. at 597.
107. Betts v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 1972).
108. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.C. 1972).
109. No. 75-C-829 (N.D. Ill., March 31, 1975).
110. Id. at 5.
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infringe upon them at all."' A transfer from one class to another or to
a nearby school might have a beneficial effect on a student who has
experienced problems in getting along with a particular teacher. On the
other hand, as the Quintinella case illustrates, disciplinary transfers may
be the functional equivalent of expulsion." 2  At the very least, the
details of the transfer will probably appear on a student's permanent
record. The best solution may be to require procedures similar to those
formulated for alternatives to suspensions'1 3 in cases in which the
transfer is between classes or to a nearby school and more formal
procedures similar to the ones required for long-term suspensions"14
when there is a danger that the transfer will result in the discontinuation
of a student's education.
Programmatic transfers, that is transfers for the purpose of avail-
ing a student of educational opportunities not available at his present
school, also raise difficult questions. If the claim is that such a transfer
deprives a student of an opportunity to a "regular" education or an
education in his neighborhood school, the benefits of a special program
may so outweigh these other factors that, on balance, the transfer
enhances rather than infringes upon a protected interest." 5  Because
they involve many of the same factors, programmatic transfers should
be treated like special education determinations rather than disciplinary
transfers." 6
The interests involved in transfers designed to implement overrid-
ing public policy such as school desegregation are entirely different
from those discussed thus far. If the transfer is either part of a court-
ordered plan required by the fourteenth amendment or a general policy
implemented by a law-making body," 7 those affected by the policy
have no absolute right to be heard. Thus, due process procedures are
unnecessary.
111. One commentator has suggested that in light of the expressed policy of 20
U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1970), which makes the neighborhood the appropriate basis for
determining public school assignments, students may have a vested property interest in
attending a neighborhood school. Weckstein, supra note 94, at 53.
112. Quintinella v. Carey, No. 75-C-829 (N.D. MIl., March 31, 1975).
113. See text accompanying notes 154-56 infra.
114. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
115. See Special Education, supra note 98, at 118-19.
116. See text accompanying notes 135-47 infra.
117. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
Although a due process challenge to court ordered or voluntary desegregation plans is
not available, students and parents may still resort to judicially and administratively




Handicapped children "form an extraordinarily diverse group esti-
mated to include between 8.7 and 35 percent of the entire student
population."'118 The problems associated with this part of the school
population have often been overlooked; but recently, the large number
of handicapped children completely excluded from school, the likeli-
hood that normal children may be incorrectly classified as mentally
retarded, especially if they are members of a minority group, and the
high likelihood of children initially classified as special remaining in
such a category permanently, have come to the public's attention." 9
When they have ruled on the subject, courts have generally held that
the classification of a child as in need of special education should be
accompanied by extensive due process protections similar to those re-
quired for long-term suspensions and expulsions. 120 However, the
ambiguous nature of the protected interests involved' 2 ' combined with
the complexity of a special education decision, which, unlike the ques-
tions of fact that due process procedures are best at answering, is really
"a selection of the most appropriate [choice] from an unlimited range
of alternatives,"' 22 make increasing the burdens on the school system by
requiring formal due process procedures in connection with every spe-
cial education decision difficult to justify. 123
The ambiguity of the protected interests involved stems from the
large number of variables that enter into such a decision. For instance,
if a student is correctly evaluated as in need of special educational
opportunities, removal from the regular classroom and placement in a
special program, rather than depriving him of the state-granted entitle-
ment to an education, as in the case of suspension, expulsion, or
118. Special Education, supra note 98, at 41, citing N.Y. STATE CCMM'N REPORT ON
THE QUALITY, COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC. 9B.2 (1972).
The difference in the figures is accounted for by disparities in estimating the percentage
of brain-injured and learning-disabled children. Special Education, supra note 98, at 41
n.2.
119. The ground-breaking cases in the area are Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) and Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See L. LIPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO
EDUCATION: AN ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
CHILDREN (1973); Special Education, supra note 98, at 58-59.
120. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 877-83 (D.D.C 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-06 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (consent decree).
121. Special Education, supra note 98, at 118-19.
122. Id. at 120.
123. But see McClung, School Classification: Some Legal Approaches to Labels,
14 INEQUALr IN EDUCATION 17, 21-22 (1973).
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exclusion, may be an enhancement of such an entitlement by providing
a more expensive, personalized education.1 2 4  On the other hand, if a
normal student is misclassified and placed in a special education pro-
gram, he is being denied a public education guaranteed by state statute
and is also severely stigmatized by being labeled as in need of special
education. 125 Moreover, assuming a student is correctly classified as in
need of special education, if the education that is provided is inferior to
that received by normal students, the state-provided entitlement to an
education may be infringed upon.'26
Due process procedures are traditionally designed to guard against
erroneous action by insuring that the decisionmaker has heard both
sides of a controversy before making a factual determination. 127 In
special education decisions, factual determinations are often important
only in making the initial determination that a child is in need of special
education. 128  Once such a determination is made, the educational
needs of the child must be evaluated and a choice from among available
programs as to the most suitable placement must be made; highly
formalized procedures may impede rather than facilitate this decision.' 20
In addition, highly formalized adversary procedures may be particular-
ly inappropriate when the parties involved have an equal interest in
classifying the student correctly and the standards upon which decisions
are to be made are relatively clear. 3 '
Practical experience with due process hearings in special education
determinations in the only two instances in which their implementation
has been ordered by the courts confirms their problematic character.
More than a year after a court mandated elaborate procedural safe-
guards in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania'"' (PARC) there is a backlog of cases, uneven application of pro-
124. Special Education, supra note 98, at 119.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 118.
127. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583.
128. Such a determination is traditionally made after evaluation of standardized tests
and teacher recommendations. However, many commentators have pointed out the
cultural bias inherent in such tests. See Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal.
1972); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 475 (D.D.C. 1967), af!'d en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Kirp, supra note 53, at 754-58.
129. For instance, it is questionable whether the presence of counsel, whose orienta-
tion is toward an adversarial mode and who is particularly sensitive to procedural
niceties, would be particularly helpful in the process of determining the best special
education placement for a particular student. See Special Education, supra note 98, at
130-33.
130. See text accompanying note 231 infra.
131. 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-06 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent decree).
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cedural guidelines, and little uniformity among decisions.13 2  Similarly,
a court order in Mills v. Board of Education33 has been of little practi-
cal significance because the special educational programs mandated by
the court have yet to be implemented."3 4
Both doctrinal analysis and practical experience indicate that some-
thing other than a traditional due process hearing is desirable in special
education determinations. That there should be a presumption in favor
of regular classroom placement, 3 5 adequate notice before a new place-
ment is made,"3 6 and some chance for parents to discuss the placement
with school officials is generally agreed upon.3 7  However, some com-
mentators believe that additional due process procedures are unneces-
sary in all cases, preferring to make formal review on the part of a re-
view committee discretionary' 38  They also believe that the right to
counsel and cross-examination may be unnecessary in connection with
such hearings.3 9
A compromise between the highly formal proceedings mandated in
PARC and Mills and a completely discretionary hearing provision
might be the best solution. The compromise solution would require a
hearing 40 with respect to the special education classification while allow-
132. Special Education, supra note 98, at 79-80.
133. 348 F. Supp. 866, 877-83 (D.D.C. 1972). The opinion contains six pages of
required procedures.
134. Special Education, supra note 98, at 92-94.
135. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 6902.06 (West 1975); MAss. ANN. Lkws ch. 71B, § 3
(1974); Mills v. Board Of Edue., 348 F. Supp. 866, 881 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Special Education, supra note 98, at 136.
136. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880-81 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsyl-
vania As'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 303-04 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Special Education, supra note 98, at 127-28.
137. The PARC and Mills cases require full blown due process hearings if parents
request them, see notes 135-36 supra; however, some commentators would only make an
informal conference mandatory. Special Education, supra note 98, at 123-30.
138. Special Education, supra note 98, at 123-25. Such a system, it is contended,
would cut down on the volume of hearings while insuring that important decisions
would be examined. Id. The discretionary process would be coupled with an elaborate
screening process that would bring cases to the review committee for consideration
whether or not they were contested. Id. at 124.
139. Id. at 130-35.
140. Whether the hearing should be adversarial in nature, providing for the presence
of counsel and the right to cross-examination, or less formal, involving only the parties
to the dispute and an unbiased decisionmaker should be determined by the needs of each
particular school system. If "dead-end" placement is a recurring problem, then the more
formal hearing is necessary. If there has been no history of special education place-
ments being used as a means of discipline or punishment, non-adversarial hearings are
appropriate. If informal hearings result in abuse by school officials of the special
education placement, more formal hearing requirements should be required.
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ing a further hearing regarding placement to be at the discretion of a
review committee. Such a solution would provide procedural protec-
tions when protected interests are most clearly at stake; that is, it would
protect the liberty and property interests of a normal student in a regular
classroom education. Moreover, it would insure that school officials
do not by-pass due process procedures required in other school deci-
sions such as expulsion and suspension by merely labeling a student
as mentally retarded and exiling him to a "dead end" track. On the
other hand, the proposal would provide maximum flexibility in the dd-
cisionmaking process once a student's need for special education is le-
gitimately established. In addition to a formal procedural mechanism,
informal methods might be adopted to obtain informed parental con-
sent with respect to placement decisions and thus, in most cases, avoid
the need for a hearing at all. 41
5. Alternatives to Suspension and Expulsion
As the shortcomings of suspension and expulsion as viable educa-
tional tools become more apparent, educators are beginning to develop a
number of alternative approaches for dealing with disciplinary prob-
lems. In terms of procedural due process, such programs present a
difficult dilemma. On the one hand, many educators believe that
continued inappropriate behavior on the part of a student indicates that
the student has special needs and should be placed in a program that
can meet those needs.142 The approach is, in reality, a form of special
education for children with emotional problems and seems to warrant
the non-adversarial procedures that have been suggested for special
education determinations. On the other hand, the danger of erroneous
action in connection with these alternatives is as great as it is with
suspension or expulsion. 4 3
Although such action does not constitute a complete exclusion from
the educational process, the liberty and property interests of an innocent
student are infringed, at least to some degree, by removing him from the
regular classroom and requiring him to attend an alternative pro-
gram.' 44 Moreover, there is a danger that alternative programs will
141. See text accompanying note 259 infra.
142. E.g., Redl, Disruptive Behavior in the Classroom, 83 U. CHI. SCHOOL RV. 569,
592-93 (1975).
143. The term "alternative to suspension" connotes that the student has committed
an act that would justify his suspension. If the student denies the charges made against
him, the danger of erroneous action is identical to the situation discussed in Goss with
respect to suspensions.
144. McClung, supra note 123, at 28.
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become "dumping grounds" for students who are "different' or hard to
teach but have violated no rules.14 5 Although the dilemma does not
yield an easy resolution, an examination of specific alternatives using the
mode of analysis employed with respect to other school determinations
will at least give some examples of possible procedural approaches.
The following are examples of alternatives to suspension and ex-
pulsion currently in use in the public schools: the "cooling off" room, a
non-threatening atmosphere where students are sent, or in some cases
choose to go, for short periods of time in order to unwind;14 6 in-school
or after school counseling and group work designed to offer an opportu-
nity for students to talk about the situations in school and at home that
cause them problems as well as acceptable behavioral responses to these
situations;147 behavior modification programs in which appropriate stu-
dent behavior is reinforced and inappropriate behavior discouraged,
often on the basis of a point system;' 4 alternative classes in which
students may be placed temporarily so that they may receive intensive
counseling and instruction for a limited period with the aim of returning
them to the regular classroom; 49 and alternative schools for students
who have exhibited repeated behavior problems in the traditional school
atmosphere. 15 0
With respect to alternatives that do not remove students from the
regular classroom or remove them for short periods of time, the infringe-
ment on protected interests is probably de minimis' 5 ' as long as no
notation of such an assignment appears on the student's record; there-
fore, determinations with respect to such programs probably do not
require a prior hearing.' 2 Alternatives that remove students from the
regular classroom for longer than one day present more difficult ques-
tions. 53 One approach would be to treat them like suspensions and
145. SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 96 n.2.
146. McClung, supra note 123, at 22.
147. Id. at 63.
148. Id. at 65, citing Bright & Vincent, JACS: A Behavior Modification Program
That Works, 55 Pm DELTA KAPPA 17 (Sept. 1973).
149. SouTH CAROLINA COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM, YoUr SCHOOLS 16 (May
1975).
150. Id. at 8-11.
151. This assumes that such alternatives are not used continuously with respect to
any one student. If a student is removed from class for three hours every day for a week
the infringement is probably no longer de minimis.
152. One commentator believes that with respect to all alternatives, parents and
students should be able to opt for exclusion rather than accept the proposed alternative.
McClung, supra note 123, at 28.
153. One day seems to be the period of time that the Supreme Court held to meet
the de minimis test in Goss. See note 77 supra. Goss dealt with complete exclusion
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require the same procedures as those adopted for suspensions and
expulsions. Such an approach would provide protection against erro-
neous action but have the disadvantage of placing the parties in an
adversarial relationship when, in fact, they have a common interest in
developing an effective alternative to the traditional classroom pro-
gram.1"4 In addition, any similarity of the procedures to those em-
ployed with respect to suspensions might cause these alternatives to take
on many of the negative connotations associated with traditional discipli-
nary measures, a difficulty the alternative programs were expressly
designed to avoid. On the other hand, the danger that such alternatives
could become the functional equivalent of suspension and be used as a
means of avoiding the more formal procedures required for other disci-
plinary action cannot be overlooked.:55
One possible solution is creation of a presumption that the alterna-
tives are a form of special education thus warranting analogous proce-
dures. The presumption could be rebutted by evidence of either wide-
spread unfairness in the use of these alternatives or evidence that the
alternatives are the functional equivalent of suspension rather than a
viable alternative. In either case, procedures identical to those required
for actual suspensions would then be required.'5 6
6. Behavior Modifying Drugs
Although the effectiveness of behavior modifying drugs, especially
for hyperactive children, has come under increasing attack from ex-
perts, 57 for some students, school attendance is conditioned upon their
use.'58 Such a policy probably constitutes an infringement on a stu-
dent's liberty interest in that it is an invasion of both privacy and bodily
from the educational process, however, which is not the case when alternatives to
suspension are implemented. It could be argued that protected interests are not infringed
upon since the exclusion is not total, and thus due process procedures are not required at
all. Contra, Weckstein, supra note 94, at 51-52.
154. See text accompanying note 230 infra.
155. SusPENsIoNs, supra note 10, at 96 n.2.
156. These formal procedures should be imposed only until the defects which
prompted them are corrected.
157. E.g., FEiNGOLD, WHY YOUR CHLD Is HYPERACTIvE (1975). Dr. Feingold has
successfully treated hyperactive children, one of the major targets for behavior modifying
drugs, by prescribing a special diet free of the artificial additives found in convenience
foods and soft drink powders.
158. Divoky, Toward a Nation of Sedated Children, LEARNINo 8, 10 (March 1973).
See generally Ireland & Diamond, Drugs and Hyperactivity: Process is Due, 8
INEQuALrrY IN EDUCATION 19 (1971).
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integrity. 159 If the use of such drugs is permitted at all, it should occur
only after a special education hearing and, in addition, provision should
be made for continual and systematic review of the appropriateness of
the drug so that its use can be discontinued as soon as possible.
7. Corporal Punishment
Although substantive attacks on corporal punishihent per se have
been generally unsuccessful,160 courts have recently held that the inflic-
tion of corporal punishment violates a student's protected liberty inter-
est, thus requiring at least some due process protection. In Ingraham v.
Wright, 6" an action challenging the constitutionality of corporal punish-
ment on substantive as well as procedural grounds, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit characterized the protected liberty
interest as the right to remain free from unwarranted punishment. 162 In
Baker v. Owen,'63 a challenge to North Carolina's corporal punishment
statute on substantive and procedural grounds, as well as to the imple-
mentation of the statute in a specific instance, a three-judge district
court, after describing the broad reach of the protected liberty inter-
est,' 64 described the student's interest in this way:
lilt seems uncontrovertable that the child has a legitimate interest
in avoiding unnecessary or arbitrary infliction of a punishment
that probably would -be completely disallowed as to an adult. More-
over, North Carolina has itself given school children reasonable
expectation of freedom from excessive or pointless corporal punish-
ment by writing into [law] the requirements that such punishment
be reasonable and used for specific purposes only.' 6 5
In determining what procedural safeguards are required, the Baker
case is also instructive because it was decided after Goss and expressly
built upon the procedural framework the Supreme Court had given for
short-term suspensions.' 66 Judge Craven, writing for the three-judge
panel, required the following procedures in connection with the admin-
159. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-70 (1966).
160. E.g., Sims v. Board of Edue., 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971); Ware v. Estes,
328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972).
Contra, Glaser v. Marrietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
161. 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. Id. at 267.
163. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (three judge court), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 210
(1975).
164. Id. at 301-02.
165. Id. at 302.
166. Id.
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istration of corporal punishment: 1) corporal punishment must be
approved by the school principal before it may be used in a particular
school; 0 7 2) except in rare instances, 16 corporal punishment must
never be used either as a "first line of punishment for misbehavior"''0 0 or
"unless the student was informed beforehand that specific misbehavior
could occasion its use";170 3) the "teacher or principal must punish
corporally in the presence of a second school official" who must be
informed in the student's presence of the reasons for the punishment; 71
and 4) the "official who has administered such punishment must pro-
vide the child's parent, upon request, a written explanation of his
reasons and the name of the second official who was present."'' 2
It is significant that the court in Baker required procedures to
accompany the use of corporal punishment different from those required
in Goss for short-term suspensions. Specifically, in addition to requir-
ing some kind of hearing, the court required the presence of an official
other than the disciplinarian at the time that punishment is adminis-
tered. Although the court does not state its reasoning, apparently it is
concerned with the potential for abuse in the use of force as a means of
punishment. While the impact of a three-day suspension is relatively
uniform, there may be wide disparities in the amount of physical force
employed when virtually unbridled discretion is placed in the hands of
the official administering it.'73  Especially in light of the Supreme
Court's affirmance of Baker,74 procedural safeguards accompanying
the use of corporal punishment, in addition to providing for some kind
of hearing, should probably be designed to limit the discretion of the
disciplinarian in the amount of force that may be employed.
8. Ability Grouping
Ability grouping or tracking is a practice in which students are
placed in curriculum levels according to the school's assessment of their
ability to learn." 5 Its purpose is to provide "maximum educational op-
167. Id.
168. Rare instances are defined as "misconduct . . .so anti-social or disruptive in
nature as to shock the conscience." Id.




172. Id. at 302-03.
173. E.g., Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
174. See note 163 supra.
175. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 442 (1967), affd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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portunity for children of widely ranging ability levels .... 9176 How-
ever, like other educational decisions that "label" students and provide
for something other than a mainstream education, at least some forms
of ability grouping may require due process procedures.
Determining the protected interests involved in ability grouping or
tracking decisions involves a substantive analysis of the context in which
the decisions are made. If there exists little difference in the quality of
education between tracks, special efforts to tailor the curriculum to the
needs of the students in each track, and opportunity for movement
between tracks, misclassification may involve only a de minimis in-
fringement on protected property and liberty interests.'" On the other
hand, if there exist disparities in the quality of education between tracks
with the highest tracks getting a larger share of available resources, 178
little effort to provide compensatory programs as part of the lower track
curriculum, 179 and little or no opportunity to move from the lower to the
higher tracks,180 misclassification may involve a serious infringement on
protected interests. 18 1  A student who is mistakenly placed below the
average track may be denied the kind of education to which state
statutes entitle him. Such mislabeling may also stigmatize the student
in the eyes of fellow students and teachers, as well as make further
education virtually impossible and job opportunities limited.'8 2 One
commentator characterized placement in a low track this way: "A child
who is effectively labeled "dumb" will inherit a diluted education and a
stigma which will signficantly affect all his future dealings with his
friends, teachers, family, and prospective employers."'8
If a student is mistakenly placed in an average track instead of the
college preparatory track, it is more difficult to find an infringement of
protected interests especially if the state entitlement is merely to a public
176. Id. It should be noted that at least one court has distinguished between
tracking within a school and the establishment of special schools for the academically
talented, stating that the latter is not "predictive" nor does it isolate students of "less
promising ability." Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264,
1268 (9thCir. 1974).
177. The dividing of a class into "reading groups" is an example of this kind of
classification.
178. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 468-74 (1967), af'd en banc sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
179. Id. at 469-73.
180. Id. at 464-68.
181. See McClung, supra note 123, at21.
182. See id. at 21-22.
183. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
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education. 84 It might be argued, however, that placing an above
average student in an average track infringes on protected liberty inter-
ests in view of the impact of such a placement on future educational
and employment opportunities.18- The argument would gain additional
force if there is little realistic opportunity for upward movement within
the tracking system, for in such a situation, there is little opportunity to
correct the mistaken classification.
Since tracking decisions are often made by relatively standardized
criteria,' 8 6 due process procedures need only insure that there is no
mistake in the application of such criteria.18 7  Notice of the tracking
determination, access to the data used to arrive at the decision, and an
opportunity for an informal hearing so that possible errors could be
called to the attention of the decisionmaker would probably suffice.1 88
If tracking decisions involve more than the mere mechanical applica-
tion of test scores and are made on the basis of teacher recommenda-
tions and psy6hological evaluations, 8 9 there exists a greater opportunity
for abuse of discretion on the part of the decisionmaker, and procedures
similar to those used with respect to special education might be more
appropriate.
9. Extracurricular Activities
The courts generally consider extracurricular activities an integral
part of the total school program. 90 Not only do they provide additional
educational opportunities but also they often have a significant impact
on a students future educational and employment opportunities. For
this reason, some courts have recognized participation in extracurricular
activities as a property right that is entitled to due process protection. 91
184. Cf. Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1267-68
(9th Cir. 1974).
185. The analogy to Goss here is particularly appropriate. If suspension from
school for only one day infringes upon protected liberty interests, then certainly unfair
denial of access to a college preparatory track, a decision with much greater implications
for a student's future, should also constitute an invasion of a protected interest.
186. See Kirp, supra note 53, at 755.
187. An analysis of the substantive problems associated with standardized achieve-
ment tests, especially the potential for racial bias, can be found in Kirp, supra note 53, at
754-59.
188. But see McClung, supra note 123, at 20-22.
189. See Kirp, supra note 53, at 754.
190. Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. Ohio 1972); see Moren v. School
Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (D. Mont. 1972).
191. See Moren v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180, 1182-84 (D. Mont. 1972)
(relating participation in interscholastic sports to future educational opportunities);
Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298, 301 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (relating participation in
interscholastic sports to future vocational opportunities).
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In addition, prohibitions against participation in extracurricular activi-
ties may result in stigmitization that would have a serious negative
impact on a student's future, thus infringing upon the liberty interest.
In Warren v. National Association of Secondary School Principals,'92
an action challenging the expulsion of a student from the National
Honor Society, the district court considered the infringement serious
enough to require not only notice and a hearing but also an impartial
decisionmaker. 193
Because the interests involved may vary considerably, no one set of
procedures will be adequate to deal with all prohibitions on participation
in extracurricular activities. If the prohibition involves a generalized
school board policy, is non-accusatory in nature, and can be applied
without an involved factual determination, then summary procedures
may be adequate. Such was the case in Dallam v. Cumberland Valley
School District,'94 an action challenging on substantive and procedural
grounds a school board rule that prohibited a transfer student whose
parents resided in a different school district from participating in inter-
scholastic sports.'9 5
On the other hand, some determinations about extracurricular
activities involve interests analogous to those involved in suspensions
and expulsions. The Warren case is a good example. There, expulsion
from the Honor Society was actually a form of disciplinary action taken
in response to allegations that the student had been seen drinking at a
local restaurant.' 96 Serious liberty interests are at stake in connection
with such a charge 97 and thus, the court required formal procedural
safeguards. 98 When expulsion from an activity in which the student
has previously participated is involved and the expulsion is based on
allegations that the student violated a rule that conditions participation,
the same procedures adopted for suspensions and expulsions should
apply. In most cases, the interests involved are serious enough to
192. 375 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
193. Id. at 1047.
194. 391 F. Supp. 358 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
195. Although the fact situation in Dallam distinguishes it from other denials of
participation in extracurricular activities, the court based its decision on the fact that
there was not a "complete exclusion from the educational process," thus distinguishing
this case from Goss. Id. at 361. For an analysis of the shortcomings of this point of
view see Weckstein, supra note 94, at 51-52.
196. 375 F. Supp. at 1046.
197. Id. at 1048.
198. The court stressed the importance of an impartial decisionmaker when a
determination to suspend a student from the Honor Society is made. Id. at 1047.
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require the procedures mandated for long-term suspensions. 09
10. Censorship of Student Publications
If prior restraints on student publications are constitutional at
all,200 the first amendment requires that the accompanying review pro-
cedures be "prompt and adequate."' 20 1 A recent decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit indicates that, after Goss,
such review procedures must also include "the right of the student to
appear and present his case" if suspension from school is involved.20 2
In Nitzberg v. Parks,2 °0 an action challenging a school system regula-
tion which empowered a principal to prohibit distribution on school
property of literature not sponsored by the school if obscene or libelous,
Justice Tom Clark held that Goss requires "confrontation and a hearing
of some type before a step as drastic as suspension is taken. ' 20 4  It is
reasonable to believe that similar procedures will be required with
respect to other forms of student expression.20 5 Interestingly, Justice
Clark suggested that questions of prior restraint of student publica-
tions206 might best be handled by some form of student-faculty commit-
tee that would give all sides a chance to air their grievances so that the
"bitterness generated by an unpopular refusal of [an] administrator to
allow circulation of a student publication might thus be alleviated."207
The opinion indicates that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the first
amendment claims raised in cases such as Nitzberg, the courts will
allow, and even encourage, innovation in the implementation of protec-
tive procedures.2 8
199. Although Warren does not detail all of the procedures necessary in connection
with suspension from extracurricular activities, the court pointed in the direction of
requiring procedural formality in such decisions. Id. at 1047-48.
200. Compare Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th
Cir. 1972), Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57-59 (4th Cir. 1971), and Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 805-08 (2d Cir. 1971) with Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1357 (7th Cir. 1972) and Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d
148, 149 n.2 (lst Cir. 1971).
201. Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975).
202. Id. at 384.
203. 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
204. Id. at 384. Although the opinion deals specifically with first amendment
procedures which must exist independently of any due process requirements, it indicates
that any school regulation which involves suspension as a penalty for violation must
include an opportunity for the accused student to be heard as part of the fact-finding
process, a position consistent with the holding in Goss.
205. See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
206. A problem, he states, which has continually plagued the Fourth Circuit. 525
F.2d at 384.
207. Id.at385.




The process of evaluating a student's performance has uniformly
been characterized by the courts as "an educational question, the final
determination of which is vested . . . in the [school] officials." 20 9 The
only exceptions to this rule arise when school officials abuse their
discretion,210 act arbitrarily or capriciously,211 or act in "bad faith."2 2
The exceptions are most often applied when school officials use aca-
demic penalties for disciplinary purposes. Thus, in Brookins v.
Bonnell,213 an action in which a nursing student was dismissed from
school allegedly for academic reasons, the court held that the school was
in reality enforcing rules of student conduct and therefore the student
was entitled to a hearing with respect to her alleged misconduct. 4 If
the action of school administrators can be characterized as disciplinary
rather than academic, due process procedures may be necessary.21,
The only additional qualification requires the infringement on liberty
or property interests to be more than de minimis, a limiting principle of
questionable significance in view of the Goss determination that a
suspension of only one day does not fall within that category.
The courts have previously upheld challenges to expulsion from
college and graduate school for allegedly academic reasons216 but have
not yet been faced with actions challenging a final course grade. One
cannot help but think that such challenges are not far away in light of
the enormous competition for entrance into college and graduate school
as well as the impact that grades seem to have on a student's future
employment opportunities. The logic of Goss indicates that at least
some procedural safeguards are necessary with respect to virtually any
grade challenge21 ' although the scope of review would probably be
limited in view of the courts' reluctance to intervene in academic
matters. Only when it is alleged that academic penalties are being
exacted in place of disciplinary action as a way of compromising the
209. Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. 'Vt. 1965), citing
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
210. State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 (1942), cert.
denied, 319 U.S. 748 (1943).
211. Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372, 377, 245 N.W. 125, 127 (1932).
212. Gasper v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1973).
213. 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
214. Id. at 383-84.
215. See Buss, supra note 53, at 585.
216. E.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965).
217. 419 U.S. at 597-98 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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student's procedural rights would the courts be likely to require formal
due process procedures similar to those required in disciplinary matters.
THE INVESTIGATORY MODEL-AN ALTERNATIVE
To ADVERSAmNESS
Establishing the existence of protected interests with respect to a
wide range of determinations made by school officials is a relatively
simple process when compared with the task of devising a system that
protects these interests. Traditionally, courts have relied almost exclu-
sively on procedures that can be characterized as modifications of the
adversary system. Yet even the casual reader of Goss will detect in both
the majority and dissenting opinions an uneasiness about imposing an
adversarial mode of decisionmaking upon a school system.
Justice Powell, in his dissent, states that one of the most "disturb-
ing aspects [of the majority decision is its] reliance upon . . . the
adversary process" which may be harmful to the ongoing student-
teacher relationship that is "rarely adversar[ial] in nature.1218 The
majority stresses that it is not requiring a traditional adversary proceed-
ing that includes the right to counsel and the right to cross-examine
witnesses in connection with short suspensions because it may be "in-
appropriate in a classroom setting. '219 In fact, it can be argued that
the majority's reluctance to impose an adversarial mode generally in
the public school context resulted in its formulation of summary proce-
dures for short-term suspensions which provide little or no real protec-
tion for students against arbitrary administrative action.220
There is, however, nothing about our concept of due process that
requires school officials to adopt an adversary proceeding in every
instance in which procedural safeguards are required. 221 Indeed, com-
mentators are beginning to suggest that, at least in certain areas of mass
justice such as welfare eligibility determinations, the adversary system
might be replaced by an investigatory system in which the decisionmak-
er plays a more active role.2 22 With respect to some, but not all, of the
school determinations discussed thus far, such a system has much to
commend it. An investigatory system could efficiently provide proce-
dural safeguards for the majority of school decisions, reserving adver-
218. Id. at 594.
219. Id. at 583.
220. Weckstein, supra note 94, at 49.
221. Wright, supra note 15, at 1060.
222. Friendly, supra note 7, at 1289; Verkuil, supra note 15, at 852-55.
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sary proceedings for instances in which they are particularly appropri-
ate.
The investigatory model of decisionmaking is characterized by the
large amount of control vested in the decisionmaker.223 Unlike the
adversary model in which the "judge" plays an essentially passive role
and maximum control is vested in the opposing attorneys, the investiga-
tory model gives the decisionmaker complete control of the proceeding
allowing him to determine what evidence he thinks is relevant, to call
and examine his own witnesses, to ascertain applicable rules and,
through this process, eventually reach a result.2 24
Although such a system might, on initial consideration, seem auto-
cratic, many important determinations are made in our society daily in
just such a way. A prime example is the forest ranger who issues or
denies a camping permit on the spot even if the applicant has a prior
reservation. 25 Thibaut and Walker, in their groundbreaking study of
procedural models, found the investigatory model effective in resolving
disputes that are cognitive or non-competitive in nature.2 2 6  In such
disputes, both parties "have a common interest in deciding on the
correct or best solution" and thus, "share in any gains or losses that
attend their interaction. 227 If the parties are interested in reaching a
quick decision and a clear standard for decisionmaking exists, the
investigatory model becomes even more desirable as a mode of decision-
making.228 Thus, if the parties implicated by a particular decision do
not have a high conflict of interest there is no advantage in placing them
in an adversarial relationship in order for the decision to be made.
Many of the decisions that are made daily in the public schools are
suited to this investigatory mode. As one commentator perceptively
stated, school officials and students are seldom placed in an adversarial
relationship except when school officials attempt to end tle educational
relationship entirely by means of expulsion, suspension, exclusion, or
"dead-end placement." 229 When the determination involves a judgment
concerning the most effective educational approach for a particular
223. J. THmBAuT & L. WALyE, PocEDuRAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYisS
22-23 (1975).
224. Id. at 24.
225. 36 C.F.R. § 2.5 (1966).
226. TmBIATJT & WALKmR, supra note 223, at 8. It should be noted that the study




229. Weckstein, supra note 94, at 49.
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student, all parties affected by the decision have a common interest in
the decision being correct.
For instance, in a special education determination, neither parents
nor school officials have any interest in classifying a student incorrectly.
If a retarded student is placed in a regular classroom without being
given special support services he will inevitably have great difficulty in
keeping up with the class and will also pose problems for the teacher
who has neither the time nor the training to provide the needed atten-
tion. Moreover, misclassification will probably increase the likelihood
that the student will drop out of school entirely. On the other hand, if a
correct special education placement is made, almost any child, no matter
how retarded, can benefit from the educational process.28 ° Similarly, if
a normal child is placed in a special education class not only is the child
denied the chance to receive the kind of education to which he is
entitled, but also the school is unnecessarily expending what are usually
scarce resources for special education.231
This reasoning applies to other determinations made by school
officials such as those involving tracking and alternatives to suspensions.
Other determinations, such as those involving grades and censorship
may involve at least some conflict of interest among the parties. How-
ever, school officials gain little by giving a student an arbitrary grade or
unfairly prohibiting distribution of a student publication. Such deter-
minations fall somewhere between those that can be resolved through a
pure investigatory mode and those that are appropriate for the adversary
system.
Nevertheless, just because some conflict of interest exists among
the parties is no reason to abandon the investigative model completely,
especially when the degree of conflict is not high. Thibaut and Walker
suggest that the greater the amount of conflict among the parties, the
more fruitful it is for them to exercise some control over the decision-
making process. 232 Thus, mechanisms are needed that can shift the
amount of control that the parties have in the decisionmaking process
according to the nature of the decision. This shifting can be accom-
plished in a number of ways. Student-faculty committees provide for a
diversity of input in the decisionmaking process, allowing the parties an
230. See Special Education, supra note 98, at 42.
231. The assumption that there is a congruence of interests between school officials
and normal children with respect to special education placements assumes that school
officials are acting in good faith. For a discussion of possible abuses of the special
education classification, see note 119 and accompanying text supra.
232. See generally THmBAYr & WALKER, supra note 223.
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opportunity to present their points of view to a decisionmaking body
that is at least partly composed of their peers.233 Even review boards
that merely engage in discretionary review of initial determinations give
the parties some control over the decisionmaking process in that they
can have an initial determination reassessed by an impartial third party.
Perhaps the most promising means of altering the control of the
parties in the decision-making process is the office of the ombuds-
man.2" 4 This procedural devise has already found wide acceptance in
some civil law countries which have had wide experience with the
investigative mode23 5 and is gaining increasing acceptance in the Unit-
ed States.23 6 Although the term ombudsman technically connotes a
rather specialized governmental office,237 it has come to stand for an
independent official whose job it is to protect against arbitrary adminis-
trative action.238 Typically, an ombudsman is available on short notice
to any member of his constituency to hear complaints and when neces-
sary to investigate them through informal channels. 23 9
Where it has been implemented, the effectiveness of the office of
ombudsman has been remarkable. Its chief value seems to be its ability
to humanize the bureaucracy so that officials remember that "their acts
touch beings, not cases-people, not papers. ' 240  Often, the matters
handled, even if they are "technically justiciable, would almost certainly
never be taken to court.' 241 Typical of these disputes is a disagreement
between a fisherman and a game warden about the interpretation of the
law, a request by a craftsman that he be able to keep his expired license
233. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. See also Nitzberg v. Parks, 525
F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975).
234. For an overview of past experience with the ombudsman as well as proposals
for its implementation in the future see W. GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS
(1966); W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERCANS COMPLAN (1966) [hereinafter cited as
GELLHORN]; THE OMBUDSMAN: CrnznN's DEFENiDER (D. Rowat ed. 1965) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Rowat].
235. See generally Rowat.
236. See generally B. FRANK, OmBUDSMA SURVEY: JULY 1, 1974-JuNE 30, 1975
(International Bar Association Ombudsman Committee and American Bar Association
Section of Administrative Law, Ombudsman Committee 1975) [hereinafter cited as
OMBUDSMAN SUavRY].
237. Rowat at 24.
238. Freedman, Philadelphia: What Being Brotherly Means, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1,
1974, § 1, at 29, col. 2.
239. E.g., Freedman, An Ombudsman's Angle of Vision, U. PA. AMANAc, Sept. 17,
1974, at 4-5 [hereinafter cited as Freedman].
240. GELLHORN at 42. This is actually another way of saying that the ombudsman
provides the parties to a disagreement at least some control over the decisionmaking
process. See text accompanying note 228 supra.
241. GELLHORN at 42.
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as a momento, and the citizen's demand that his fingerprint record be
destroyed after he was exonerated of the crime for which he was
arrested . 42  Although in many cases the ombudsman has few, if any,
formal sanctions to utilize in enforcing his opinions, he is generally
respected and has an enormous capacity both to right past wrongs and
to implement corrective measures so that governmental machinery will
function more smoothly in the future.243 The reason for this remarka-
ble effectiveness seems to lie in the approach that is generally taken by
ombudsmen. Rather than directing their efforts at castigating individu-
als, attention is aimed at procedures, policies, and procrastination. 244
Any disciplining of individual officials comes from -the department or
agency involved while the ombudsman concentrates on providing guid-
ance for the future.245
Proponents of the ombudsman have singled out the educational
setting as a particularly appropriate place for its implementation. 241 In
fact, between the years 1966 and 1970 approximately seventy colleges
and universities established the position of ombudsman2 47 and by 1974
fifteen schools or school districts had followed suit.2 48 Although there
is not a great deal of information yet available about the effectiveness of
these newly created positions, preliminary reports are encouraging.
Professor James 0. Freedman, who has served as ombudsman at
the University of Pennsylvania since 1973, is enthusiastic about the
office especially with respect to matters of academic tenure and allegedly
unfair grades. 249 His office listened to the grievances of more than 200
people, students, faculty, and non-academic employees of the university
during the years 1973-74 and that experience has convinced him of the
important role of the ombudsman in insuring that the university ob-
serves fair administrative procedures. 250 Luther W. Seabrook, principal
of William O'Shea Intermediate School 44 on Manhattan's West Side,
and Steven R. Kaminsky, the Student Ombudsman for I.S. 44, are also
enthusiastic about the office of ombudsman in the public school con-
text.25 1 Kaminsky sees himself as a person not aligned with any partic-
242. Id.
243. Id. at 44-48; Freedman, supra note 239.
244. GELLHORN, supra note 234, at 46.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 208-11; Verkuil, supra note 15, at 857-60.
247. Freedman at 4.
248. O BuDSmAN SuRvEY, supra note 236, at 46-47.
249. Freedman at 4-5.
250. Id.
251. See SUSPENSIONS, supra note 10, at 21-25.
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ular element of the school administration and consequently, he main-
tains, students feel more comfortable talking to him about difficulties
that they encounter in school.252 He functions as a troubleshooter and
facilitator who tries to identify both students' problems before they
become serious and resources within the school and the community that
may be helpful in solving these problems.2 53 Kaminsky is a paid
member of the school administration 254 but in Philadelphia, the election
of a volunteer ombudsman who may be a student, parent of a student,
or school counselor is provided for as part of a "Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities for High School Students. ' 2 5 The volunteer ombuds-
man is charged with informing students of their rights and attempting to
facilitate compromises with respect to disputes between students and
faculty2 56 Thus it is hoped that the ombudsman will encourage infor-
mal discussions between the parties involved in a dispute prior to the
invocation of formal grievance procedures.257
As these preliminary reports indicate, the office of ombudsman can
perform a number of important functions within the school context.
The position is particularly attractive in the framework of the investiga-
tive model because of its potential to shift at least some control of the
decisionmaking process from the decisionmaker back to the parties. 58
This result can be achieved in a number of ways. First, and
foremost, the existence of an ombudsman encourages the resolution of
disputes before a hearing of any kind is necessary.2 59 Typically, the
ombudsman might arrange an informal conference involving all parties
to a determination with the hope that such a discussion could resolve the
dispute. Second, an ombudsman aids students and parents who want to
avail themselves of a hearing to obtain one.260  In this way, the om-
budsman can insure that members of the school community are aware
of their procedural rights.and know how to exercise them. Third, the
ombudsman is present at all hearings as an impartial observer. Specifi-
cally, the ombudsman can keep an eye on the admittedly autocratic
252. Id. at 24.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Philadelphia Board of Education, Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for High
School Students 6 (1974). All persons elected to serve as ombudsmen are required to
undergo special training before assuming office. Id.
256. Id. at 6-7.
257. Id. at 7.
258. See text accompanying notes 233-34 supra.
259. E.g., Philadelphia Board of Education, Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for
High School Students 7 (1974).
260. E.g., id. at 6.
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aspects of the investigatory model and make recommendations for the
conduct of future hearings if he believes that the broad discretion vested
in the decisionmaker is being abused. He might also be given the
power either to order a new hearing or to submit a report as part of an
appeals mechanism. Fourth, the ombudsman can keep an eye on many
of the broad issues that are implicated by school determinations. For
instance, he could keep records on the racial composition of the lower
tracks, the various alternatives to suspension, and the special education
classes; if one race was disproportionately represented he could scruti-
nize the procedures involved to determine if they were racially biased.
He might also observe the movement between tracks, especially from
lower tracks to higher ones in order to determine whether evaluation of
students' abilities was an on-going process instead of a one-shot deter-
Mination. 261
It can readily be seen that the ombudsman has the potential to
become an indispensable element in the implementation of the investiga-
tory mode of decisionmaking. By providing a mechanism for shifting
some control of the decisionmaking process back to the parties, the
ombudsman makes it possible, in many cases, to dispense with an
adversary system completely and yet provide a meaningful check on the
procedural abuses that are always possible when broad discretionary
power is vested in the decisionmaker. If the ombudsman can perform
that function effectively, then the investigatory mode becomes a very
attractive means of providing fairness with respect to the majority of
school decisions, reserving the adversary system for situations in which
it is both necessary and appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Although the full implications of Goss v. Lopez for the everyday
conduct of schools may not be realized for some time, Justice Powell's
prophetic dissent points to a large number of previously discretionary
decisions made by school officials that are encompassed by the majori-
261. Challenges involving these broad issues have been and can be made in the
context of the legal system. In fact, in the past the courts seemed to be the only place
that such grievances could be redressed. See Blatt, The Legal Rights of the Mentally
Retarded, 23 SYRAcUsn L. REv. 991, 993 (1972). But law suits are expensive,
divisive, and often ineffective. See Special Education, supra note 98, at 58-96. If the
ombudsman is qualified to do the job and is given enough independence to do it
effectively, recent experience suggests that he can be more useful and effective than
continual resort to litigation. Thus, the ombudsman may, in some cases, be in a position
to remedy the kind of systemic unfairness that has previously been resolved only by
highly complex law suits.
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ty's reasoning. Goss has already influenced lower courts to require due
process safeguards in connection with corporal punishment and prior
restraint of student publications. The key issue that must be faced with
respect to this expansion of procedural requirements is how it can be
accomplished without destroying the fundamental institutional relation-
ships that the procedures are designed to protect. Justice Powell in his
dissent implicitly raises this issue when he expresses his concern about
the future of the student-teacher relationship in the context of required
procedures that place parties to a particular educational determination
in an adversarial position.
Alternatives to adversariness exist where they are appropriate.
Civil law countries, for instance, base their judicial system on an
inquisitorial or investigative mode which facilitates decisionmaking by
placing maximum control in the hands of the decisionmaker. Although
empirical research tells us that such a procedure is not optimal with
respect to all conflict resolution, it may be particularly suited to many of
the educational determinations implicated by Goss. When the ombuds-
man, a procedural device that allows for shifts in the amount of control
the parties have in the decisionmaking process depending on the nature
of the controversy, is incorporated into the investigatory model, the
integrated model stands as a viable alternative to adversary procedures
for many everyday school determinations.
Thus, Goss need not be viewed by those responsible for making
public school policy as an unwarranted imposition of a decisionmaking
process that is ill suited to the educational setting. Rather, the land-
mark decision can be seen as an invitation to develop informal proce-
dures that provide for fundamental fairness. Whether the challenge
is welcomed or not, those who are responsible for the public schools
must face it as they come to grips with the implications of Goss.
BURTON B. GOLDSTEIN, JR.*
* The author wishes to express his thanks to the staff of the Harvard Center for
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